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In Latin America, post–Cold War ideas about defence and security broke down 
geopolitical logics that had been historically accepted by Latin American armed forces. These 
ideas also provoked a partial downfall of one component of their traditional strategic 
representations: This geopolitical determinism explained post-colonial conflicts as being due 
to historical influences and to disputes about power and territory. Paradoxically, national 
frontiers are emerging and are threatened by destabilisation. The new conception of the border 
and its revalorisation at the strategic level must be related not only to the character of post–
Cold War threats but also to the new security vision prevailing in the international system. 
This vision cannot be separated from US strategic representations, which emphasise the 
“global” character of risks and security mechanisms. Thus, it appears that the transnational 
dimension of the strategic representations promoted by the United States does not correspond 
to the traditional concept of national territory. This concept, which is the basis of the 
reshuffling of military architecture in Latin America after the Cold War, is rooted in a 
representation of the region that has been present since the 1940s but was systematised under 
the Democratic Clinton Administration in the 1990s and further developed under the 
presidency of Republican George W. Bush in the early twenty-first century. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this paper is to examine and hightlight the critical issues of  security and 
the defence of frontier areas in Latin America. In such places, the traditional paradigm of 
sovereignty comes into conflict with a new paradigm, one still in gestation, which is centred 
on the political and strategic representations (1) of the United States that aim to dilute national 
sovereignty in favour of global interests. In effect, the conflict seems to express the 
discrepancy between a global economy and a system of security, particularly  on the 
periphery, that is still based on territorial defence.  
Paradoxically, in a context in which globalisation as a process and as an ideology 
challenges the idea of borders, national frontiers are emerging and are threatened by 
destabilisation.(2) Territorial and boundary disputes still  exist and some have appeared for 
the first time.  
 
The importance of frontiers at a strategic level must be examined in light of the new 
security and defence questions that have been identified by Latin American armies. These 
questions relate to the evolution of menacing entities and to the United States’ intention of 
exporting its own strategic representations.  
In the 1990s, Latin America witnessed the birth of a strategic model, which has 
expanded since September 2001, whereby the United States promotes, at a global level, a 
security system that is centred on the transnational violent regulation of spaces. (3) Meant to 
manage an international denationalized system, this model is based on paramilitarised local 
vigilance, domination and repressive devices, all of which are intended to preclude all 
questions concerning the possible enlargement of liberal democracy and a market economy.  
 
The model takes its form from norms and rules that tend to limit sovereignty  
through global decision-making processes whose objectives are to guarantee the security of a 
global economy and its means. It not only aims to disaggregate, in the name of political and 
economic freedom, any principle of national territorial sovereignty in favour of a 
universalisation of the enjeux of security but is also compatible with the state-centred answer 
to the events of 11 September 2001, as well as with the new global mission known as the 
struggle against terrorism.  
 
This new regulation has led to a review of the notions of national security  
and frontier. Next will come a reconsideration of internal-external relations, the links between 
civil and military spheres, the control of legal and illegal transnational networks, aspects of 
enemies and threats and notions of territory and sovereignty.  
The modifications that have come out of this model have deeply affected the idea of 
both national territory (sovereignty’s traditional symbol) and security institutions. They have 
also meant the end of old representations of the frontier as a limit to the management of 
sovereign power. Indeed, this model has introduced a major problem for institutions such as  
armed forces, for which defence of sovereignty has been the main justification  
for their existence.  
 
Globalisation has caused a major crisis for Latin American armies because their 
existence is so closely bound to traditional conceptions of the national state, territories and 
security. Except for Colombia, and its policy of “democratic security”, and Venezuela, with 
its post-modern version of “people in arms”, there is not, in post–Cold War Latin America, a 
strategic program comparable to what existed during the Cold War, either in civil society, in 
military institutions or in the political community.  
 
Increases and changes in threats raise questions about traditional forms of intervention, 
military planning and, in particular, representations of the enemy. Identification of threats to 
the state or to ideology seems to be in a state of ongoing crisis, despite the comeback of states 
exporting ideology tinged with revolutionary messianism, such as that of Hugo Chavez in 
Venezuela. This strategic vacuum has been filled by various options that are poles apart, such 
as participation in international missions, political commitments to rebuilding the idea of 
“nation” and “state” or the use of the army for police tasks in the domain of domestic security. 
(4) The post–Cold War period maximises Latin American strategic heterogeneity. (5)  
 
Studying strategic representations and practices (6) enables a consideration  
of sovereignty and territory in settings in which frontiers – which functioned during the 19th 
and 20th centuries as isolated compartments of social conflict that allowed the organisation of 
a monopoly of legitimate violence – are going through a paradoxical process. Even as they 
become a strategic priority, they are widely questioned.  
 
Such an undertaking also explains the isomorphism and some of the characteristics of 
Latin American armed forces. In addition, it makes it possible to analyse changing tendencies 
concerning the management of violence and to propose a prospective vision of possible 
evolutions, not only in armed and security forces but also in the policies of the United States 
in Latin America in relation to changes on a worldwide scale. Furthermore, it allows an 
understanding of the problem of the influence of strategic cultures (7) in the design of security 
as the ideological and social values that underlie the violent management of Latin America’s 
chronic instability.  
 
Whether we are talking about tangible demonstrations or about representations,  
such deep changes are at stake in Latin America that it is necessary to emphasise the tipping 
points and the breakdowns more than the continuities, although we should be careful not to 
underestimate these.  
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF TERRITORY IN THE NATURE OF THREATS 
 
At several levels, differences exist not only between countries and regions but  
also between security institutions; in Latin America, post–Cold War ideas about defence and 
security broke down geopolitical logics that had been historically accepted by Latin American 
armed forces. These ideas also provoked a partial downfall of one component of their 
traditional strategic representations: This geopolitical determinism explained post-colonial 
conflicts as being due to historical influences and to disputes about power and territory.  
 
Even when a conflict expresses a traditional subregional polarity in the form of a 
confrontation between states, as in the case of Uribe’s Colombia and Chavez’s Venezuela, it 
is more in relation to the problems of the post–Cold War period than a logic of territory 
established on historical relationships between power and space or territorial distribution. This 
does not imply, however, the negation of the inertial dimension of regional competition  
or the weight of the territory in the imaginaire collectif.  
 
In Latin America, since the formation of post-colonial states, “neighbourhood  
Geography” has strongly influenced decision making. Territorial conflicts were the most 
visible forms of contesting state sovereignties. Currently, in many countries, struggles for 
influence over territories are developing regardless of ideologies and are reappearing in 
different situations. However, and it is a Latin American paradox, if conflicts between states  
over boundaries are relatively frequent, wars between states are relatively (8) rare. 
 
Thus, we are facing a new vision of relationships linking territory and security, a 
vision that shocks traditional strategic representations based on territorial proximity and 
affects the more general idea of “border areas as limits to be defended”.(9)  
The three geo-strategical logics of conflict – fluvial, maritime and territorial – that 
established representations of territorial proximity have been dislocated. Changes are shown 
through a decrease in the orthodox adherence to the “realist theory” (10) of international 
relations and to geopolitical concepts that characterised an important part of Latin American  
military thought. In the post-bipolar world, strategic representations have developed in which 
neither ideological conflict nor regional war is at the centre of military-planning concerns. 
The main changes are the end of the presence of external “historic” adversaries and the 
alteration of the nature of enemies, meaning that threats no longer are associated with a state.  
Although the lack of homogenous strategy is still a characteristic of Latin America, a 
few problems with common strategic value can be underlined. This does not imply 
considering the army as a uniform entity: Differences exist between different armies and 
inside the institution itself.  
 
Latin American armies developed from people’s militias that formed during the wars 
of independence. This particular history, which is linked to the idea of liberation and 
emancipation, gave armies a long-standing legitimacy. In Latin America, the fight for 
independence, civil wars and the conquest of territories modelled the nation in its most literal 
sense, armies having had a central role in the definition of state limits and the establishment  
of collective identity. In the nineteenth century, regular armies had two important functions: 
1) to be used as a factor of national unity, reinforcing official centralisation with the 
elimination of provincial caudillos; and 2) to incorporate territories through exploration and 
conquest, sometimes resulting in the elimination of native populations. A third function, 
inherited from the old colonial order, was to guarantee the balance of power with 
neighbouring states.  
 
However, another function was added to these traditional functions (defending 
national borders and guaranteeing political sovereignty): that of preserving internal order. 
Based on political, social and geographical instability, armies became the guardian of the 
social order, the protector of borders and the promoter of collective identity. During the Cold 
War, Latin American armed forces thought and acted in terms of power interest, according to 
the ideas of H. Morgenthau. (11) With some slight differences, they almost all shared 
traditional “Realist Theory” principles: a pessimistic vision of human nature, the idea of the 
state as an autonomous unitary actor, anarchy as the organising principle in international 
relations, subordination of moral to national interest, perception of war as an endemic element  
of politics, primacy of the state and national identity conceived as universal in time and space, 
war as a trans-historic phenomenon and the need for armed forces to face the traditional 
dilemma of security.  
 
Within the framework of the realist paradigm, the balance of power notion structures 
foreign-policy construction. By hoping to act in the national interest, armies have thought of 
politics as a “zero sum game”. Any action by one state was perceived as detrimental to 
another. For Latin American armies, what was really at stake in state relationships was power 
and rivalry. Balance of power sustained peace in South America from the second half of  
the 19th century on, and the consolidation of this system is one explanation for the low 
incidence of warfare among South American states.  
 
The issue of territory must be considered within the framework of geopolitical  
thought that developed as a “science”, which would establish appropriate laws of the space for 
judging the rights of states to specific territories. Throughout the twentieth century, 
geopolitical intentions were an essential element in the strategic representations of Latin 
American armies, mainly in Brazil, Chile and Argentina.  
 
Latin American geopolitics is the direct heir to this ideology of conquest,  
which was born at the end of the nineteenth century and created important stereotypes that 
spread to political communities. This ideology emerged at the same time as European 
imperial expansion and the rise of science and modern industry, and geopoliticians could be 
found in Latin American military academies who were convinced by the scientific reasoning  
of German geopoliticians. (12) It is not surprising, therefore, that in this area, geopolitics 
continued to be used during the second half of the twentieth century as it was at the beginning 
of the century.(13) By contrast the post–Cold War period has seen the weakening of the 
effects of traditional forms of geopolitical conceptions.  
 
On the other hand, the importance given to territory by the armed forces cannot be 
separated from Clausewitz’s (14) ideas considering territory as an essential factor of war, 
together with population. Latin American armed forces defined the concept of territorial 
defence centred on a very narrow idea of general interest. This representation of territorial 
sovereignty led to an absolute “sanctuarisation” of the defended object. This logic would be  
driven to its paroxysm by the Argentinian and Brazilian nuclear programmes, which 
represented attempts to sanctuarise their territories through nuclear deterrence.  
 
Directly inherited from Spanish-Lusitanian conflicts in the La Plata region, relations 
between Argentina and Brazil were based on mutual mistrust and competition to establish 
hegemony in the Southern Cone. Their rivalry took the shape of a low-intensity war of 
prestige, during which true conflict never seemed to be a credible proposition. The real 
territorial conflicts could not be compared with those of other regions. Thus, unlike other 
hegemonic arguments, Argentinian-Brazilian rivalry did not imply a constant risk of war 
between the different states of the region; rather, there was a shared determination of both 
countries to consider the region as a secondary strategic place. In Latin America, “hereditary 
enemies” never developed hostility based on ethnic, religious or cultural criteria. Rivalry was 
the result of traditional conflict between nation-states inherent to a particular conception  
of the search for regional hegemony. It was about normal rivalry between regional powers and 
a result of “neighbourhood logic”. Thus, Argentinian-Brazilian rivalry was closer to the 
Franco-German conflicts of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century than to the 
Indo-Pakistani conflict. (15)  
 
These rivalries and their consequences – paranoiac attitudes and sentimental overloads 
– have justified arms races between South American countries. However, arms races, 
impossible to divide of corporatist interest, have never had the importance of other zones. 
These races, even the nuclear ones, did not constitute a serious threat to safety and regional 
stability.  
 
This perception of the nature of threats did not disappear with the rise, during the 
second half of the twentieth century, of the other component of traditional strategic 
representation: the “ideological threat” and its corollary, the “enemy within”. Throughout the 
Cold War, subregional polarities (Argentina-Brazil, Argentina-Chile, Chile-Bolivia, Chile-
Peru, Peru-Ecuador, Venezuela-Colombia) accompanied internal war and social-control  
practices.  
 
The geopolitical and strategic representations of the Latin American nations are, 
essentially, terrestrial. Land oriented, this representation is a result of the adaptation of the 
European paradigm of strategic interaction with the neighbouring state. However, Latin 
America has developed a heterodoxical conception of national neighbourhood, in which the 
“neighbourhood logic” is modified by the ideological dimension of the impact of threats and 
by the presence of foreign forces. Since colonial times, the Latin American evolution of 
territory has been deeply affected by worldwide incidents.  
 Since the second half of the twentieth century, US security and defence policies have 
had a strong influence on the Latin American conception of regional security. The presence of 
the United States in the hemisphere has meant an important transformation of the European 
paradigm of strategic interaction between neighbouring states as a result of the post-colonial 
order.  
 
The United States was decisive in constituting the “ideological threat”, as expressed in 
the Doctrines of National Security (DSN) and its consequence, “ideological borders”. Since 
the 1940s, through its hegemony, the continental dimension of security action has developed 
in the name of defence of the West, expressed in three institutions: OAS (Organization of 
American States), JID (Inter-American Defense Council) and TIAR (Inter-American Treaty 
of Reciprocal Assistance). Since the 1950s, the United States has made permanent appeals to 
the hemisphere to support the fight againt “communism”.  
 
A certain form of “Bolivarism” was at the basis of the call by the United States for the 
fight against communism and “subversion”. During the Cold War, the multiplication of 
military advisers, permanent contacts between armies, joint exercises, and the training of local 
armies all hightlight not only the importance of the United States in the security policies of 
the subcontinent but also its continental dimension. The Inter-American Defense Board, 
training courses with the Inter-American Defense College and biannual conferences of 
American armies established a tradition of dialogue and collaboration between the armed 
forces.  
 
The agreements that, during the Cold War, instituted the bases of the regional security 
system that underlines the objectives and consequences of the reinforcement of the inter-
American system of security aimed to integrate Latin American armies in the US strategic 
device, starting from the definition of the communist threat. This has had consequences on the 
strategic cultures of Latin American militaries.  
 
The strategic culture of Latin American elites took form in the nineteenth  
century with the formation of the post-colonial state. The emergence of the USSR and even 
more so the continuation of the Second World War, as well as the appearance of several 
populist protest movements, introduced major changes into this culture. The increase in the 
exogenic influences on the development of the strategic representations of the armed forces is 
the most important demonstration of that. For the whole of Latin America, the United States 
has had a central role in the formulation of security policies since the second half of the 
twentieth century. The influence of the French military also should be considered, especially 
at the operational level and very particularly in the Argentinian case. Nevertheless, the 
postcolonial past (nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century) is a present 
past and thus operational in Latin America.  
 
Since the 1950s, Latin American armies have detected and identified threats according 
to transnational strategic representations. Indeed, they have developed a vision of security 
closely related to the hegemonic representations within the international system, the result of 
which was the passage of the DSN. Thus, under the command of Onganía in the 1960s, the 
Argentinian army favoured an alliance with the Brazilian army, whose objective was to form 
the core of an inter-American force to fight against subversion. In the 1970s, the “Condor 
Plan” (16)  fell under this logic.  
 
This change corresponds, on one hand, with a new international situation characterised 
by the entry of Latin America into the Cold War with the Cuban question (1959) and with the 
redefinition of the threats established by the United States. On the other hand, it corresponds 
with national situations characterised by the autonomy of the army compared to the civil 
capacity and by the emergence of new politico-social actors like the populists. In the 
Argentinian case, emphasis must be placed on the role of the passage of the Doctrines of 
National Defense, which centred on the territorial threat within the DNS, which, in turn, 
centred on the ideological threat in the attempt to counter the effects of Peronism in the 
society and the army after the 1955 coup d'état. (17)  
 
However, the competition of “neighbourhood logic” is a fact that could not be 
eliminated, either by the continentalisation of the armed forces or by the influence of the 
United States, via the DNS. US hegemony has been irrelevant in explaining the prospects of 
war and peace between states in Latin America and the United States has played a limited role 
as an intermediary. (18)  Although US occupation of Nicaragua in the early twentieth century  
may have temporarily stopped wars in Central America, it did not settle the underlying 
conflicts. (19) The second half of the century witnessed important conflicts related to 
territories: Honduras–El Salvador (1969), Argentina–Chile (1978), Guatemala–Belize (1981), 
Argentina–United Kingdom (1982) and Peru–Ecuador (1995).  
 
The will of the area’s authoritarian regimes to establish military alliances to fight 
against international communism and communist representations of the international system 
did not prevent traditional rivalries. Domination and mistrust were at the centre of these 
strategic representations, since the principal regional actors, under this logic, conceived of 
themselvesas being beyond ideological and cultural cleavages.  
The similar perception of the domestic and international order held by the military 
regimes of the 1970s, however, did not hide a mutual suspicion at either the bilateral or the 
subregional level. Despite moments of ideological understanding between these military 
governments, mistrust toward their neighbouring states continued, and even increased. The 
conflict between Videla’s Argentina and Pinochet’s Chile in 1978 illustrates this. Their joint 
action internationally did not preclude them from being wary of neighbouring states’ armies 
and did not make it possible for them to avoid conflict at the regional level.  
 
In Latin America, any strategic analysis must consider the contradictions between the 
fact that under US influence the dynamics of security in the Southern Cone have been largely 
regionalised since the Second World War and the fact that the regional balance of power and 
the fight for hegemony constituted a priority for certain countries of the area, particularly 
between Brazil and Argentina from the 1940s until the 1980s.  
 
 
A MAJOR STRATEGIC MODIFICATION 
 
A period of strategic uncertainty has begun due to the loss of the traditional image, or 
perception, of the enemy. In the post–Cold War period, debates on security issues focus on 
the new concept of safeguarding interests, which can no longer be conceived as the 
“traditional” defence of a country’s borders or territory. It has entailed a major modification in 
the conception of sovereignty that had characterised the region. This new representation of  
the world is gradually imposing itself and changing the traditional attachment to the 
protection of territory in its traditional form. Traditional military threats (territorial 
aggressions and dominations, power rivalries, proliferation of biological, chemical and 
nuclear weapons) are either not included in military statements or subordinated to new 
strategic concerns.  
 
Concern about increased military capacities has been focused on Chile only since the 
mid-1990s. Bolivia and Peru have repeatedly accused Chile of promoting an arms race, a 
consequence of the end of the US ban on arms sales in Latin America, known as the 
Humphrey-Kennedy Act. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the concern also focuses 
on Venezuela, although the portion of GDP dedicated to military expenditures remains low  
in this country. Arguing that they are renewing obsolete military equipment, Chile and 
Venezuela have become the main arms buyers in Latin America. However, the type of arms 
bought in each case illustrates a deep strategic rift between the two nations. While Chile has 
opted for the most technologically advanced weapons, Venezuela has acquired material that it 
will use mainly to arm a significant proportion of its own population. The United States has 
expressed concern about Venezuela buying its arms from Russia – mostly Kalashnikov 
assault rifles – because it suspects that Chavez is channelling the guns to Colombian 
guerrillas. The United States and Colombia have both shown concern over the purchase of 
weapons by the Chavez Administration. (20)  
However, Latin American armies have not built a new threat as important  
as that of communism. For the states that make up the post–Cold War inter-American system, 
the principal threats to the democratic governments are drug-trafficking and organized-crime 
activities, terrorism and political and social instability. (21)  
 
Clearly, the problem of the alteration of the security system is settled. The OAS 
General Assembly in Santiago de Chile (June 1991), after considering the issue of 
hemispheric security co-operation, continued with declarations of defending democracy, 
mechanisms of collective security and arms control and limitation of weapons of mass 
destruction (22); this assembly set up the foundation for the construction of a co-operative 
security system. In October 1991, at the Inter-American Defense College in Washington, DC,  
the chief of staff of the Argentinian navy, J. Ferrer, in the context of a strong connection 
between the Argentinian and US governments, maintained that the old theory of strategic 
planning based on a war with a determined enemy had become unrealistic and that a military 
capacity without determinism, or pre-established enemies, was needed. During the nineteenth  
American Army Conference in Washington, DC (November 1991), the General Secretary 
declared that as far as Latin American armies were concerned, the challenges were political 
violence, drug trafficking and the economic and social conditions of the region. He hardly 
mentioned the traditional missions of armies. (23)  
 
The modification of the collective security system conceived during the Cold War was 
a central question in the Pan-American strategic debate of the 1990s. This system, of which 
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) was the most obvious expression, 
was designed to address extra-continental, traditional threats coming from a state having a 
territorial character.  
In South American states during the 1990s, the tendency to think in terms of 
traditional military power to protect territory lost momentum. This resulted not only in the 
traditional conflict hypothesis becoming out-of-date but also in the beginning of a 
predisposition to co-operation on military questions. A growing confidence in the regional 
security scheme had led to the disappearance of the traditional fear of the threatening 
neighbouring state. This transformation of the state’s relationship to territory and region is  
highly significant. Since the 1980s, a new model of development, economic liberalisation and 
regional integration has significantly modified territories in Latin America.  
 MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) has changed relationships and transformed 
the nature of conflicts. The construction of an interstate peace zone is a major strategic fact. 
Integration has deeply affected the old logic of the threatening state. This transformation in 
strategic representations must be understood in relation to the construction of a South  
American peace area among states. To do so, it is necessary to consider the process of 
democratisation and the recovery of civilian control over the military, especially regarding 
defence policy, which was historically denied to civilians.  
 
In the early 1990s, conflict perceptions were informed by geo-economics. Rivalries of 
an economic order in particular appeared in the economic and communication policies of 
MERCOSUR. Thus, Brazil’s will to drive the economic flows of MERCOSUR through the 
economic pole formed by Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina (especially Porto Alegre 
harbour) appears like an update of geopolitical principles. In the 1930s, Mr. Travasos, an 
important Brazilian geopolitics specialist, supported the idea of ending the natural attraction 
that the Rio de la Plata exerted on the Mediterranean countries. He explained that Brazil 
should do so by attracting Bolivia and Paraguay to the Brazilian harbours. The Santos-
Corumbá-Santa Cruz de la Sierra railroad is the result of this strategic thought.  
 
The nature of national armies and security forces, the threats and the regional security 
system were all redefined by the MERCOSUR integration process. Since the end of the Cold 
War, security dynamics have been considerably regionalised. (24)  However, despite the 
weakening of this geopolitical determinism (which explains conflicts by the influence of 
history and by rivalries over power and territory), security is still fundamentally conceived  
according to a national view. Latin American military institutions are aware that the post–
Cold War era is a historical break from the past. The consequence of this change is the search 
for a new strategic doctrine to fill the void left by the DSN. However, in accordance with the 
realist tradition, the state is still considered the fundamental actor in international relations. 
Latin American military institutions continue to follow the Hegelian idea that the highest duty 
of the state is its own preservation. (25)  
 
These strategic alterations have been inserted into the international system, despite the 
tendency, observed since the Cold War, of territory, in its traditional form, to lose importance 
in conflicts between states. (26) The concept of territory underwent important modifications 
with the transformation of the historical relationship between power and space. (27) 
Currently, the territorial reference to sovereignty is minor. The representation of space is freed 
from the physical borders suitable for traditional geopolitics, and the concept of territory has 
widened because of technological transformations and human behaviour. Paradoxically, this 
reduction of the strategic relevance of territory does not imply the same for borders. The Latin 
American border areas remain a zone of geopolitical friction and tension. Thus, the recovery 
of the strategic importance of the borders came with the end of the Cold War.  
 
By the end of twentieth century, the most serious boundary disputes in South America, 
the result of colonial legacies (Argentina and Chile; Ecuador and Peru), were definitively 
settled. Only four territorial, non-maritime, classical disputes still remain active today. Three 
are decolonisation issues that are consequences of British colonial policies after Latin 
American independence: between Argentina and the United Kingdom, between Venezuela  
and Guyana and between Guatemala and Belize. The other is an irredentist issue mixed with 
the problems related to neo-liberalism: Bolivia’s search for an outlet to the Pacific Ocean. 
However, at the same time, the post–Cold War era saw the re-emergence of a series of 
disputes and the emergence of new controversies in the Caribbean and the Andes. (28)  
 
In Latin America at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the resurgence of 
sovereignty conflicts cannot be explained simply by the residual weight of territory in 
collective representations or because states still have not dealt with their colonial legacy. The 
resurgence of conflicts must be explained in relation to the crucial question of the control of 
“flows” and “stocks”, whether legal (oil, gas, water, minerals) or illegal (drugs, smuggling, 
migrants, etc.).  
 
Thus, the conflicts in the Caribbean region must be examined in light of the 
controversies and rivalries involving resources, whether “real” or “imagined”. These are the 
result of a 1982 revision in the international maritime law (United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Seas) that extended maritime jurisdiction and the development of new 
technologies to exploit marine and seabed resources. The appearance of the autonomist 
movement in the Zulia region of Venezuela or in the Bolivian Oriente must be studied as part 
of the debate about the appropriation and use of the profits derived from oil and gas.  
 
Bolivia has become the paradigm not only of the relationship between conflict and 
sovereignty on resources but also of the return of secessionism, irredentism and 
annexationism. However, the Oriente region’s appeal for autonomy carries much more weight 
than the claim by a minority of Oriente dwellers to become part of Brazil or Argentinian 
fundamentalists’ nationalist claims for the Tarija province or the claim by a minority of 
Peruvians for the Pando province. In Bolivia, events that have occurred since April 2000 have 
renewed tensions between integration and division, but the danger of fragmentation cannot be 
blamed on grass-roots movements but rather on the elites of the Bolivian “Oriente”, who seek 
to benefit from the economic possibilities of gas.  
 
In fact, opposition to liquefied petroleum gas exports from Bolivia to the United States 
through a Chilean harbour was a central element in the popular upheaval that led to the 
resignation of President Sánchez de Lozada in 2003. This problem has since resurfaced on the 
diplomatic agenda and brought back a fundamental issue of South American geopolitics: 
Bolivia’s sea access. But, far from the traditional territorial claim, this question is based on a 
sovereignty demand for the control of the exploitation of nonrenewable natural resources.  
 
The reference to Chile should be understood in the context of the most traditional 
residual character of nationalism. The Bolivians’ anti-Chilean feeling can be better 
appreciated in light of the rumours about the utilisation of Chilean mercenaries for civil 
murders by the government of Sánchez de Lozada. However, the present conflict must be 
understood not only through the collective memory of the Pacific War and the loss of territory 
in 1883 but also in the context of the resistance to the depredation of national resources, 
which are exploited by transnational firms. This struggle is part of a conception of sovereignty 
that runs deeper than that based on territorial claims. The purpose of the popular uprising was 
to prevent gas from taking the same route as silver, nitrate and tin. It is not a question of 
principles against natural resource exports, but rather a refusal of the detrimental conditions  
of natural resource negotiations that have damaged the Bolivian state and its citizens. The 
importance of the Bolivian movement lies in the fact that the marginal sectors of its society, 
and some sectors of the armed forces, have become fully aware of the need to recover their 
expropriated natural resources.  
 
It does not seem likely that a context of spilled-over conflicts between states will lead 
to a regional war, yet the fear of this occurring is still felt in the region. Since the 1990s, 
Colombia has been the most obvious example of this. In the context of “Plan Colombia”, the 
bordering countries have shown their preoccupation with the permeability of borders. The 
border is a central component of a conflict that is defined by the increased autonomy of non-
state actors compared to their heterogeneity, the control of illegal “flows” and “stocks” and a 
high degree of intervention by the hegemonic power, the United States.   
 
The concern of the governments of the countries bordering Colombia has increased 
due to the expansion of the armed struggle, in particular, toward the Amazon basin. Brazil, 
Peru and Venezuela have indicated that the military component of “Plan Colombia” will 
affect the whole Amazon region, specifically, in terms of expulsion toward their borders of 
narcos and guerrillas, migrant populations, actions of paramilitary organisations, expansion of 
illicit crops, pollution, and so forth.  
 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, a retrospective view illustrates the 
dimension that borders have taken in Colombia’s relationship with its neighbouring states. 
The constant incursions of the Colombian military into Ecuadorian territory to pursue 
guerrillas have caused a deteriorating relationship between the two countries. Panama also has 
increased the deployment of its security forces (it has no military institution) along its border 
with Colombia. To the activities of the FARC – Front 57 – and the paramilitaries must be 
added two other issues: organised crime (kidnapping and drugs, illegal migrants and arms 
trafficking) and a humanitarian problem with Colombian refugees in the Darién region. The 
Panamanian government and the United States perceive both these issues as threats.  
 
Brazil has beefed up security on its border with Colombia, a priority of the United 
States, by launching the Calha Norte plan in order to prevent border crossings by guerrillas 
and drug traffickers. The Brazilian military is engaged in the fight against organised crime 
and increasingly views the drug trade as a national security issue. However, the Brazilian 
Minister of Defence, J. Viegas Filho, has said that the government will not modify the  
constitution to accommodate US policy. (29)  
 
Venezuela is of particular importance in this scenario. Colombia, the main ally of the 
United States in the area, plays a central role in the US policy of containing the “Bolivarian 
Republic”. In March 2006, US President George W. Bush proposed that US aid should be 
used against all “threats to Colombian national security”.(30) The murder of Venezuelan 
soldiers (which Colombia has blamed on guerrillas and Venezuela on the paramilitary) and  
the capture of the FARC leader R. Granda are directly related to the question of sovereignty 
and the permeability of borders. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has accused the 
Colombian government of violating his nation’s territorial sovereignty with American 
support. The Colombian military and the Uribe government have accused Venezuela of not 
fighting international terrorism. Chavez, however, considers the FARC neither a threat to his 
government nor a terrorist organisation.  
 
In the post–Cold War period, traditional conflict hypotheses that are bound to the 
territorial ambitions of a country, for example, expansionism, are depreciated. Therefore, the 
threat to territory no longer appears to be the result of national power and the military 
struggling for territorial possession, but rather the consequence of either weakened sovereign 
control, the deficit of the capacity of imperium or the loss of the national monopoly on 
violence in border regions, which enables the development of menacing entities (criminal 
organisations, subversive movements) and interventionist policies.  
 
Thus, post–Cold War conflict in relation to territory is not borne by the power of the 
states but by their weakness or their so-called weakness. Latin American states have been 
profoundly transformed, debilitated by neo-liberalism’s ideological framework. The 
modification of the nation-state concept disposing of frontier under an absolute control is one 
characteristic of the global world. (31) At the periphery, the state has difficulty mastering the 
decisive flows of the global economy (information, capital, population). (32)  
 
The principle of the intangibility of borders remains strong, the respect of political 
sovereignty is universal and the refusal of territorial invasion is unanimous; thus, in the global 
disorder, borders are profoundly affected. National borders will be more permeable than in the 
past. (33) Although the internal sovereignty principle is put into perspective by globalisation, 
the state continues to have both authority and legitimacy at the international level: States have 
armed forces, conduct diplomacy, negotiate agreements, make war, control international 
organisations and influence production and business.  
 
The absence, real or presumed, of effective sovereignty allows the development of a 
dangerous entity as it permits the intromission of hegemony. The new conception of the 
border and its revalorisation at the strategic level must be related not only to the character of 
post–Cold War threats but also to the new security vision prevailing in the international 
system. This vision cannot be separated from US strategic representations, which emphasise 
the global character of risks and security mechanisms. They confirm that the defence of 
sovereignty will no longer be limited to the protection of borders and territory. Armies must 
have a regional view on the protection of each country and work together to defend 
sovereignty with a regional conscience and an international solidarity.  
 
As far as the United States is concerned, transnational threats respect neither 
geographical nor moral boundaries and are common and require collective action. In March 
2003, the chief of the US Southern Command said that the threat to countries in the region 
does not come from the military force of an adjacent neighbour or from a foreign invading 
power. Rather, “today’s foe is the terrorist, the narco-trafficker, the arms trafficker, the 
document forger, the international crime boss, and the money launderer”. (34) In 2005, 
General Craddock of the US Southern Command stressed the strategic priorities of the United 
States in the region: the construction of a co-operative security community, populism as a 
threat to Latin American states, the existence of Islamic radical groups that take part in illegal 
activities, support for the Colombian government in its fight against armed groups and the 
influence of China in the Americas. (35) In a 2006 meeting of Latin American armies in 
Montevideo, General Craddock supported the view that although the world had changed and 
“new threats” exist today, the regions’ armies were structured according to the conflicts of the 
last century. (36)  
 
In the post–Cold War period, the security and defence policy goals for the region 
promoted by the United States are closely related to transnational concepts that tend to 
subordinate national sovereignties to global interests. This idea is based on a group of 
founding principles for “global civilisation” that were inspired by Anglo-Saxon 
representations that do not match the precepts of Latin American regional political culture.  
 
 
THE GEO-STRATEGIC VISION OF THE REGIONAL CONTINUUM 
 
Latin America, post–Cold War, appears to be of marginal strategic concern  
to the United States because there is seen to be little risk of the region becoming involved in 
global tensions. In comparative terms, the area has very low levels of military expenditures. 
Nevertheless, although the priorities of the Bush Administration suggest the opposite, Latin 
America is a key space in the geo-strategic expansion according to US norms and interests.  
The region has always been considered of interest by the United States and, since the Cold 
War, has become a source of energy flows for the United States, Europe and Asia, a 
significant market and a troubled territory (slightly legitimised powers, drug production and 
other trafficking, permanent political and social uprisings). The region has had access to the 
usual stabilisation and integration instruments (private investment, regional collaboration  
and bilateral co-operation), while US policy for Latin America has been based on the 
revitalisation of the OAS and the diplomacy of hemispherical summits.  
 
The US strategy for Latin America is based on its geo-strategic view of a regional 
continuum that can be incorporated into globalisation by the “enlargement” carried on by the 
Clinton Administration in the 1990s. The policy of ‘enlargement’ is significantly different 
from the Cold War policy of ‘containment’, which it replaced; the goal of this new policy is 
sustained expansion of the market economy and representative democracy, as opposed to a 
planned economy. (37) The two projects that express US policy in Latin America – the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the Cooperative Hemispherical Security – were 
developed during the Clinton Administration at the first Hemispherical Summit of the 
Americas in Miami (December 1994) and at the first Meeting of Ministers of Defense of the  
Continent in Williamsburg, Virginia (July 1995).  
 
However, this regionalising of globalisation, for example, the FTAA and NAFTA 
(North American Free Trade Agreement), does not take into account the difference between 
developed and underdeveloped countries and it fractures the notion of North-South 
geography. In this context, geographical continuity does not have any importance at all, a 
point of view that comes from the Anglo-Saxon tradition of spreading one model of 
production and consumption throughout the world. An example of this might be the Chilean  
demand for participation in NAFTA.  
 
Since World War II, the United States has attempted to spread its production and 
mass-consumption model if not to the whole world, at least to its main partners, (38) by trying 
to create an extended open market, while developing a network of free-trade agreements. To 
meet this objective, a number of actions must be taken, including economic reform, breaking 
down trade barriers, liberalisation of trade and investment flows, elimination of public 
industrial policies and the creation of a vast free-trade market by private sectors.  
 
After the Miami Summit of 1994, the Clinton Administration supported the FTAA, an 
idea developed by the previous Bush Administration under the name of “Initiative for the 
Americas” that was based on trade liberalisation and investment growth toward a free-trade 
zone. This idea has been supported by the present Bush Administration; in 2005, at the Mar 
del Plata Summit, administration officials revived the subject, despite resistance from 
MERCOSUR and Venezuela. In addition, during 2004–2005, the original version of the 
FTAA was sternly refused by Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela and had to be modified in 
order to obtain an agreement. The failure of the FTAA led to bilateral free-trade negotiations 
between the United States and countries such as Colombia, Peru and Ecuador.  
 As strategic projects, both NAFTA and the FTAA are heirs of the Monroe Doctrine. 
Geopolitically, the FTAA conforms to the US tradition that aims to prevent other great 
powers, such as the EU or China, from interfering in Latin America.39 Clearly, the United 
States has resolved to secure an enclosed area of influence in order to limit interaction with 
extra-regional firms and countries. By resisting economic penetration in the region, it seeks to 
exclude peer competitors. The FTAA is a way to increase its commercial presence and 
reconstitute a captive market by widening investments. This happened during the 1990s, when 
European capital had a significant presence in Latin American privatised firms.  
 
The second aim of the US tradition encompassed by the FTTA is to prevent the 
formation of a South American counter-hegemonic block. This means avoiding the creation or 
consolidation of a relatively autonomous area and subsuming regional economic-integration 
initiatives (MERCOSUR, the Andean Community of Nations) or concerted political planning 
(Rio Group) in which the United States does not participate directly. In this context, 
MERCOSUR’s disintegration under NAFTA is essential. Until the Summit of the Americas, 
MERCOSUR had occupied an irrelevant place on the US list of priorities because 
Washington was focused on other problems in other regions. For this reason, MERCOSUR 
could be consolidated without external pressure.  
 
Constructing a free-trade hemispheric zone means more to the United States than just 
eliminating internal customs tariffs that still protect large productive sectors in Latin America. 
The institutional advance toward the continent’s economic integration is not enough. State 
intervention in the economy and in the national borders appears as a limit to economic 
development. The exploitation of resources is carried out by private actors that can no longer 
be limited by territorial or political pressures. The breakdown of trade barriers must be 
followed by a physical intercommunication between the countries of America. This physical 
interconnection requires a redrawing of the whole continent’s communication system, based 
on the creation of corridors to allow a transport network. With such infrastructural integration, 
states not only compromise their territorial sovereignty but also their identity. The risk of this 
transnational project could be a partial dissolution of nation-states. The best-known project of 
transport lines between the Atlantic and the Pacific and between North and South America is 
the “Puebla-Panama Plan” through the Tehuantepec Isthmus and Chiapas.  
 
In US representations, the process of intercommunication between South and North 
America seems impossible because of the inability of some states to guarantee security on 
their own territory. The implementation of the FTAA, or of any free-trade project, not only 
implies the elimination of physical obstacles but also of political, social and military ones to 
delay the establishment of a free-trade zone. The United States needs to face these 
“disorders”. At the end of the twentieth century, US policies for the region illustrate the 
Monroe Doctrine corollary: Teddy Roosevelt’s big stick, legitimised by an idealistic 
interventionism à la Wilson.  
 
TRADE AND SECURITY: NIHIL NOVI SUB SOLE ? 
 
The market economy and liberal democracy constitute the basic elements of the US 
representation of the world. They make up the axes of US foreign affairs and are components 
of its national security strategy; they go beyond the Republican-Democrat divide. The US 
macro-strategy for the region combines trade with military actions. After the Cold War, with 
the transformation of the conflict and the concepts of power, the United States re-adopted a 
traditional definition of national security. This is a classic geopolitical Pan-Americanist view, 
inspired by A. Mahan, in which the main idea is the combination of international trade with 
armed forces. (40) However, the United States also accentuated a characteristic of the Cold 
War: the continentalisation of security.  
 
The conditions for a military offensive strategy, according to the expansion of liberal 
democracy and the market economy, were already settled when George W. Bush was elected 
US president. Former president Bill Clinton had not hesitated to state that trade was a priority 
for America’s security, declaring that US economic and security interests were inextricably 
tied. (41) After the 30th Conference of America’s Council in Washington, DC (May 2000), 
Clinton asked the Latin American countries to support “Plan Colombia” and to establish a 
close relationship between regional security, which had been upset by the Colombian conflict, 
and the effort to create a free-trade zone.  
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the war against drugs has been related to free trade. 
The threat of “narco-terrorism” is a key element of the US strategic device in the Andean 
region. It was within this framework that the first Bush Administration had set up ‘the Andean 
Initiative’, whereby military aid granted to the Andean countries was accompanied by trade  
agreements. Behind its name, which is more trade- than security-oriented, the Andean Trade 
Preferential Act (ATPA) hid more military than economic aspirations. The agreement, 
renewable annually depending on the level of co-operation of the states involved in the war on 
drugs, is aimed at the substitution of coca crops in order to limit the production of cocaine and 
its traffic. (42) More than a free-trade agreement, it acted as a unilateral commercial-
preference agreement that allowed products from Andean countries to enter the US market 
thanks to preferential customs rates. (43) Following the expiry of the first agreement in 
December 2001, a new one was signed in November 2002. The new denomination, Andean 
Trade Preferential Drug Eradication Act, betrays the primacy of Mars on Mercury. In the new 
agreement, the substitution of the coca-leaf crops is replaced by the forced eradication of 
these crops. It also includes support for “Plan Colombia” and the possible installation of US 
bases in the area.  
 
In 2005, during the visit of US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to Peru, 
President Toledo maintained that the fight against the traffic in drugs was to be accompanied 
by the support of the US Congress for the Free Trade Agreement. Toledo and Rumsfeld 
stressed their commitment to fight the drug trade and terrorism together, while Rumsfeld said 
that Peru was a leader in the area in the fight against “terror” and Toledo connected the FTA 
with the substitution of coca crops. Peruvian politicians, who underlined Peru’s lack of 
resources to battle the drug trade, asked that the United States work out a “Plan Peru”, and the 
Peruvian Prime Minister underscored the need for logistical support, stressing that the 
assistance received by Peru is very weak compared to that given to Colombia. Rumsfeld’s 
visit was accompanied by a debate on immunity for US troops as a condition for signing the 
FTA with Peru. Thus, the relationship between geography, economy and security still seems 
to determine US geopolitical expansion. The transnational representation of Latin American 
territory is based on three subsystems, Central America–Caribbean, Andean–Amazonian 
zone, South America, that must be integrated in accordance with the ideology of enlargement 
and globalisation. In terms of geopolitics, the Central America–Caribbean subsystem is the 
principal zone of interest for the United States. It has always been considered a border area; 
historically, the region has been thought of as a “mahanist” type of geopolitical 
representation. It was central to the US expansionist policy that related to the need to make its 
borders safe and guarantee its economic interests, the corollary of which was the policy of 
occupation and protectorate. In the 1930s, the “Good Neighbor” policy of Franklin Roosevelt  
was a relative exception. (44)  
 
Currently, illegal migration, drug trafficking, organised crime and a strong Latin 
American lobby in the United States are the reasons why Mexico, Central America and the 
Caribbean play such an important role in US domestic issues. (45) There is an intense 
relationship between the economic interests of the countries of these regions and the United 
States, and their economies are completely oriented toward the US market.  
 
As a direct consequence of NAFTA, the Mexico–US border has been opened to the 
exchange of goods that are difficult to control; at the same time, this fortified border works as 
a barrier to migrants. Thus, Mexican migrants are kept inside their country, working in the 
maquiladora system, in which delocalised US industries profit from the comparative 
advantages of cheap labour and competitive prices. The reconfiguration of this economic-
security space may foreshadow a second line of maquiladoras that would enable the control of 
migrant movements from Andean and Central American countries.  
 
In late 1980, in its fight against drug trafficking, the United States widened the 
traditional “Mediterranean” area toward the Andes. By the end of the twentieth century, its 
fight against narco-terrorism had led it to enlarge its area of influence toward the Southern 
Cone. The transnational dimension of the US strategic representation is observed in the 
Andean-Amazonian case, viewed as an area that is not divided into traditional national 
territories. The US representation of this zone is based on a geopolitically unified description 
of the Amazonian Andes, which is, geographically, the heart of Latin America. This 
dimension is at the centre of the new military architecture in Latin America. The change of 
name from “Plan Colombia” to “Andean Regional Initiative” (ARI) in March 2001 reveals the  
transnational character of regional conflict representations in the current Bush Administration.  
 
With this change of denomination, we are facing a major modification in the use of 
force: from a struggle against narcos and guerrillas that threatened the security of only one 
state to a regional project that focused on the pacification of the whole region and is becoming 
a global and cross-border conflict. As far as the United States was concerned, the capacity of 
the armed forces of the Andean countries was considerably reduced in the 1990s.  
 
The importance of the area cannot be dissociated from the regional geopolitical 
transformations. The main loci of instability in Latin America that represent a threat to US 
interests were located during the 1970s in the Southern Cone and during the 1980s in Central 
America. At the end of the twentieth century, the Andean area was the main strategic concern.  
 
The creation of the ARI was a fundamental moment in the design of the new US 
strategic thought. The Andean-Amazonian area exposes this dialectical relationship between 
the regional and the global that has characterised US action in the post–Cold War world: The 
confrontation is always total in its essence but always regional in its manifestations.  
 
Since the end of the 1990s, difficulties in implementing the policy of enlargement, 
especially the economic integration aspect of it, have strengthened the influence of the 
Pentagon, the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and the DEA (Drug Enforcement 
Administration) in Latin America. The number of soldiers sent on missions, permanent 
contacts between armies, joint manoeuvres, installation of military bases and material 
purchases provided evidence of the importance of “high politics” for the United States, as was 
the case during the Cold War. The United States was once again attempting to confirm its 
hegemony on the continent through its military power. Its efforts to establish collective 
defence mechanisms for multinational operations were accompanied by an increase in the 
number of multilateral security organisations: Inter-American Council of Defense, Committee  
for Hemispherical Security, Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism, biannual meetings 
of the ministers of defence, meetings of heads of state, and so on. This policy implies 
diplomatic immunity for members of the military; as such, the host country must renounce its 
jurisdictional power to investigate possible offences and sue the US government at the 
International Court of Justice. This demand has raised discussions on national sovereignty, 
one recent example of which is the Paraguayan case of June 2005. (46)  
 
The United States has always defended its national interest by the use of force. (Its 
refusal to use force in the 1930s is an exception.) The US power of intervention in Latin 
America gives a specific character to the region, although during the post–Cold War period, it 
has had fewer incentives to interfere because of the weakening of anti-system actors, such as  
guerrillas supported by foreign states. Nevertheless, the United States is free to interfere in the 
continent because there is no opposition bloc that could refuse its actions and because of the 
validity conferred by the struggle against terrorism. The different “wars” (against terrorism, 
drugs, organised crime, etc.) have confirmed the US idea of legitimate interference under the  
threat of the use of force and/or economic sanctions.  
 
Through its military presence in the region, both direct and indirect, the United States 
assures its influence in a zone that is vital to its interests. Military deployment performs a dual 
role. The first is gaining access to strategic territories such as the Amazon region in order to 
control the area’s many natural resources, both traditional (oil, gas) (47) and hypothetic (water  
and biodiversity). In 1996, at the Conference of American Armies, Pentagon chief W. Perry 
declared, “The region is a source of vital resources for our security and our welfare”. The 
second role of military deployment, which is closely dependent on what precedes it, is the 
establishment of a mechanism of control over any movement that is considered a threat to 
regional security and to the establishment of a free-trade zone.  
 
 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF “DISORDERS” 
 
Global action to consolidate political and economic stability, and stimulate their 
development according to US interests, implies the control of movements opposed to neo-
liberalism. The strength of US military forces in Latin America can be explained by the 
increase in social conflicts related to the economic policies of the 1990s.  
 
The symptoms of political and social crisis in Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina, 
the current situation in Colombia, and the mistrust of Venezuela by the United States all exert 
an important impact on the US strategy of control over populations with a strong tradition of 
insurrection. In the last few years, popular uprisings, with different levels of organisation and 
different demands, have disrupted Latin America. These social movements have emphasised 
the decline of political systems and regimes that have lost legitimacy due to their inability to 
satisfy social demands.  
 
US security policies have targeted the different movements against neoliberalism  
that developed during the 1990s. According to the US view, these movements are the result of 
democratic reforms that did not satisfy people’s needs. Acknowledging this popular 
dissatisfaction, R. Noriega, the assistant secretary of state for the Bureau of Western 
Hemisphere Affairs, stated that US policies for the region must face up to problems such as 
poverty, illiteracy and security. He also maintained that democracy and the free market 
guarantee a better quality of life in the hemisphere. (48) The failure of Latin American 
countries to adapt to the enlargement of liberal democracy and the market economy is the axis 
of US perception. The states of the region are weakened by fragile institutions and economic 
difficulties. This concept expresses the key idea of the new US national security doctrine: 
There is no mechanical relationship between poverty and terrorism, but poverty, weak 
institutions and political corruption make states vulnerable to terrorists and criminal 
organisations.  
 
In the post–Cold War period, some strategic issues appear as just updates. Viewing 
poverty as a security question to be answered by the military – discussed, for example, during 
the American Armies Conference in 1996 – is not new. Security and economic development 
have been closely bound since the late 1960s. For Robert MacNamara, development was the  
“essence of security”, (49) a thought that was supported, for example, by General O. Villega, 
the secretary of the National Security Council of the Ongania government of Argentina.  
 
In this context, besides the traditional threats such as terrorism, corruption and 
organised crime, an emergent threat in US representations is defined as “radical 
populism”.(50) This threat undermines the democratic process by reducing, instead of 
increasing, individual rights. According to General Hill of the Southern Command, (51) this 
political tendency is carried on by some leaders who “take advantage of the deep frustrations  
owed to the democratic reform failure. By exploiting these frustrations, leaders are reinforcing 
their radical positions while increasing the anti-American feeling”. He gave as examples 
countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia and Haiti but also had numerous concerns about neo-
liberal reforms. According to General Hill, the anti-American feeling has been used to 
reinforce radical leaders. He added, “we will continue to work to improve the military 
capacities and professionalism of our allies, so that they can maintain their own security and 
fight against common transnational threats”.  
 
The answer to this social instability, according to Hill, is to “help allies to face these 
threats and the structural factors that underlie them, by cooperation”. This interpretation 
illustrates the traditional distrust of the United States for popular mobilisation and mass 
political involvement in Latin America. According to the US representation, radical populism 
undermines the democratic process by reducing individual rights: Social questions are always 
individual because they are seen as individual demands on the political market.  
 
Groups opposed to neo-liberalism and the FTAA – the MST-Sem Terra (Brazil), the 
Círculos Bolivarianos (Venezuela), the Pachakutik (Ecuador) or the MAS (Bolivia) – are 
typified as radical populist movements. These movements are unified under the US political 
and strategic representations for Latin America. They are considered to be “new threats”, 
threats that represent the reappearance of an old-fashioned left that has nothing to do with the 
moderate and liberal left-wing Socialist Party of Chile.  
 
Despite having a universal influence (the experience of Venezuela’s Chavez is a 
model not only for other Latin American social movements but also for different political and 
social organisations), these movements do not aspire to become universal. In contrast to the 
traditional left, they have neither a unique ideology nor universal intentions; each one is 
created according to its own political culture, more or less influenced by nationalism. 
However, although the structures of these movements are different, their centres of gravity are 
close to each other in that they share the same view of the national and world reality, their 
national character is compatible with the development of transnational resistance, they 
promote the construction of communication networks and transnational interactions and they 
are related to the new methods of political-social protests, such as the anti-globalisation 
movement. The most meaningful expressions of this were found at the World Social Forum of 
Porto Alegre. Although these movements are based on local traditions, their worldview links 
them to a worldwide movement, without losing sight of national or regional questions. They  
support the idea of national identity in a revolutionary “messianism” that is adapted to the 
present condition and characterised by the lack of a worldwide revolutionary project.  
 
Those who oppose these movements attempt to discredit them by accusing their 
leaders of being involved in terrorism and drug trafficking. Apart from permanent accusations 
of an understanding between Hugo Chavez and the FARC guerrillas, other hypotheses have 
linked him with narcos. In 1999, General B. McCaffrey, head of the Office of National Drug  
Control Policy (ONDCP), referred to possible ties between Chavez and drug dealers, this 
information was subsequently denied by the US embassy in Buenos Aires. (52)  
 
The US ambassador has constantly criticised Bolivian Evo Morales. Since 2001, there 
have been ongoing “rumours” about the formation of irregular groups financed by Chavez and 
narcos in the Cochabamba area of Bolivia, specifically the Chapare-Yungas project, where the 
region was said to have been turned into a cocaine-production zone under the protection of  
guerrillas in collaboration with the MAS movement. According to these rumours, which 
became more significant after the Bolivian crisis of 2003, guerrilla camps were being formed, 
there were plans to murder DEA agents and cocaleros (coca growers) and other groups were 
armed with the intention of seizing private property. The aggressiveness of the Federaciones  
cocaleras and the intensifying social conflict were also rumoured to be part of this project. 
(53) President Toledo of Peru took several opportunities to denounce the Etnocaceristas, 
whom he said were being financed by drug dealers and wood smugglers.  
 
 
LAW AND SOVERIGNTY IN POST–COLD WAR LATIN AMERICA 
 
The willingness of the United States to impose its system of representations, which 
rests on a weakened concept of rights and sovereignty, touches on the concept of international 
relations that is conceived as an interaction between sovereign states founded on the 
principles of non-interference, non-intervention, respect of borders and equality and 
reciprocity between nation-states. Questions of sovereignty became a concern with the 
hypothesis of a military intervention in Colombia at the end of the 1990s.  
 
In the United States, the war against terrorism refocused and centralised  
state power and this meant building an apparatus to protect and stabilise traditional  
notions of territory. In Latin America, (54) 9/11 accelerated the reforms of continental 
institutions created at the beginning of the Cold War. This acceleration required weakening 
the traditional conception of sovereignty while taking into consideration concepts such as 
“grey zones” or “ungovernable zones”, both deeply rooted in a key idea of the strategic debate 
taking place in the post–Cold War United States, that is, the “failed state”.  
 
According to the US strategic representations, Latin America is an area where grey 
zones allow “new threats”, especially terrorism, to be implanted. The concept of ungovernable 
zones was a central question during the regional defence ministers meeting held in Chile in 
November 2002, but a consensus was not reached on this motion. On this occasion, countries 
such as Brazil and Venezuela declared their opposition to the concept.  
 
The “failed state” concept was born in US think-tanks during the 1990s. It means an 
“unstable” state, one that is unable to put its own affairs in order and that represents a threat to 
the global system. This concept confers to the United States the legitimacy to intervene in that 
state as it does with “rogue states”.  
 
According to the US representations, the institutional weakness, the fragile state 
control and the economic problems of the failed state lead to political corruption, to patronage 
systems and to illicit activities in Latin American states. However, all these features must be 
considered in the context of a global system that is increasingly subjected to liberal dynamics. 
In the case of Latin America, difficulties controlling territory must also be related to neo-
liberalism. The widening of zones where the state cannot exert direct control any longer was 
stimulated by the policies of the 1990s.  
 
The failed state is characterised by a lack of all official structure that could guarantee 
order and of what M. Weber called “the exercise of the monopoly of legitimate violence”. If 
the paradigmatic example of a failed state is Haiti, this category has been increasingly used 
since 2002 to explain the situation of social conflicts in the Andean countries. The signs of 
crisis in these countries have allowed the United States to describe them as failed states. At 
the end of 2005, the transfer of Bolivian missiles to the United States to be destroyed is 
representative of Bolivia being considered a failed state.  
 
The fact that the state is no longer able to exercise its monopoly of legitimate violence 
enables the rise of transnational actors developing illegal activities, which subsequently 
structures the zone’s economy. This is connected with a post–Cold War tendency: Criminal 
organisations (55) are trying to find new areas of operation to develop their highly profitable  
businesses. Globalisation is accompanied by new internationalised criminal elements, 
organised by cells. Some features of neo-liberalism and globalisation such as free circulation 
of capital, emerging markets and frequent indifference of banking sectors and financial 
institutions to corruption promote illegal business. In Latin America, illicit business 
contributes to increase regional destabilisation, as can be observed in the Colombian case as 
well as others, a situation that can be compared to those of Central and South East Asia.  
 
The installation of free trade zones seems to stimulate criminal activities. Smuggling 
activities, in particular, drug trafficking, have been discussed in Maicao (Colombia), Colon 
(Panama), Iquique (Chile), Chui (Uruguay) and the Triple Frontera (Brazil, Argentina, 
Paraguay).  
 
This inability of states to control a part of their territory can result in more regional 
instability, although in a less obvious way. In the cases of Paraguay (56) and Surinam, Latin 
America has revealed a phenomenon of strategic value that is spreading in the 
underdeveloped world: states recognised by the international community and legitimately 
organised that nonetheless allow the development of illegal activities. This type of state 
assumes an accomplice position, that is, it builds an institutional link that implies the 
“protection” of illegal groups while profiting from the illegal activities developed on its 
territory.  
 
In general, geography dictates the appearance of ungovernable zones, but it is not the 
only determining factor. These zones exist in areas that are difficult to access and not fully 
integrated into the national territory, which makes the development of clandestine activities 
easier. Usually, these zones are directly related to border areas: the region of Tabatinga and 
Leticia (Brazil, Colombia and Peru), the region of Darién (Colombia–Panama), the region of 
Lago Agrio (Ecuador–Colombia), Maicao (Colombia–Venezuela), the Tartagal-Orán region 
(Argentina–Bolivia) and the Triple Frontera (Argentina–Brazil–Paraguay). Early in the 
twenty-first century, the Paraguayan Chaco became a new “ungovernable” zone. The United 
States reacted to its formation by doubling its pressure on the Paraguayan government; US 
military manoeuvers with the Paraguayan army in June 2005 and its use of the M. Estigarribia 
military base are recent examples of the US presence (57) in this country. (58)  
The Triple Frontera (59) is a “paradigm” of an ungovernable zone. Formed in the 
1990s in the context of the Colombian conflict, the Triple Frontera illustrates the similarities 
between the Democrat and the Republican representations. In 1999, the anti-terrorism 
coordinator of the Department of State, Mr. Sheehan, notified the Argentinian government of 
US concerns about the increasing presence of terrorist and drug-trafficking groups in the 
region. In 2000, the United States maintained that if the moderate sectors in Iran were to be 
victorious and a peace agreement were to be signed between Israel and Syria, members of 
Hizbullah could immigrate to the Triple Frontera region and make contact with local criminal 
groups. (60) In the context of the war against terrorism, the United States notes that there are 
Islamic groups in the Triple Frontera, arguing that the ties between drug dealing and the 
FARC will be increased by the war in Afghanistan. The damage caused to heroin trafficking 
by the Afghan war has promoted an alliance between Colombian drug dealers and Islamic 
terrorists in order to develop and maintain the production and commercialisation of drugs. 
(61) In 2003, General Hill of the US Southern Command said that narco-terrorism activity 
was fuelling radical Islamic groups associated with Hamas and Hizbullah militants who were 
operating in such places as the tri-border area of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay and on 
Venezuela’s Margarita Island. (62)  
 
Clearly, the Triple Frontera is a security concern, based on the threat of criminal 
networks linked to Islamic fundamentalist groups setting up in the region, of the presence of 
sleeping terrorist cells, of operation fields for new attacks, (63) of activities financed by 
Islamic contributions and of illegal businesses. (64) Since the 1992 and 1994 attacks against 
the Jewish community in Buenos Aires, the zone has been under control. As of 1999, the 
Argentinian intelligence services have been looking for traces of and connections to Osama 
Bin Laden. US intelligence services maintain that the authors of the terrorist attack in Luxor, 
Egypt, in 1997 found shelter in the Triple Frontera. Hassan A. Mokhler, who was accused of 
having participated in this attack, was caught on the border between Brazil and Uruguay for 
carrying fake identity papers; his wife has always lived in the zone. Another suspect in this 
attack was later arrested in the region.  
 
Under US pressure, a Joint Security Command was created by the countries of the 
region. Brazil and Argentina have deployed important security mechanisms in order to 
prevent criminal actions from threatening their vital tourism industries. These mechanisms are 
used in an integrated way: national and state police forces, intelligence services, customs 
control and private security agencies for hotels and other tourist infrastructures. A contingent 
of Argentinian intelligence services staff works closely with their US counterparts. However, 
terrorist activity in the Triple Frontera has never been demonstrated. The United States has 
been unable to prove the existence of terrorist cells and the local armed forces have denied the 
presence of terrorists in the zone. According to some political and non governmental 
organisations, (65) US interest in the zone is related to the control of natural resources and 
access to drinking water. Researchers have revealed that there is a huge supply of drinking 
water in that zone, in the Acuifero Guaraní, which is probably the most important reserve in 
the world.  
Taking into account that these are bordering states, co-operation between them is 
crucial in order to stop the spread of criminal activities. The lack of state presence exercising 
efficient sovereignty does not imply, however, that the Triple Frontera zone is ungovernable.  
 
According to the US representations, Latin American states have difficulty 
acknowledging what is happening in their territory; to solve this situation, they must receive 
foreign aid. (66) But these representations are not exclusively those of the United States. At 
the end of the peace process, Colombian authorities requested that the conflict in Columbia be 
internationalised, even more so after the military intervention policy of the United States and 
the war in Iraq. (67)  
 
Colombian President Alvaro Uribe asked for an international intervention in the 
region, warning that Amazonia could be soon destroyed by terrorist actions. During his visit 
to Brazil in 2003, Uribe pointed out the risk that drug terrorism represents for the ecosystem 
and that it will be responsible for the destruction of Amazonia.(68) At the 2003 Davos 
Summit in Switzerland, Uribe declared that the situation in Colombia would soon be far more  
threatening than that in Iraq and that narco-terrorism is the major threat to the Amazonian 
area.  
 
Thus, the environmental issue appears to be a suitable mechanism to justify foreign 
intervention under the guise of co-operation in the context of regional and global 
interdependence. Environmental protection can also be linked to the war against terrorism and 
drugs because the destruction of pipelines (a tactic used by the ELN) and the activities of the 
drug culture can be understood as “environmental terrorism”. (69) The role of environmental  
issues in the redefinition of military actions in the region was highlighted in a May 2002 
meeting in Paraguay and a May 2003 meeting in Uruguay, organised for the US Southern 
Command and the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). These meetings revealed a 
new US representation, one that sought civilian-military co-operation opportunities for 
environmental protection in South America. Bearing in mind the premise that South America  
will become a genetic and water reservoir, this representation maintains that the defence of 
sovereignty will no longer be limited to border protection.  
 
The environment and the ecosystem will be of increasing importance since an 
environmental impact on a single country could affect others due to its global character. 
National armies must protect every country from a regional perspective, working together to 
defend sovereignty. However, Washington is finding it difficult to persuade Latin American 
countries of this new role for environmental issues. For example, Brazil was present at the 
meeting in Paraguay, but did not attend the following one in Montevideo. The position on 
human global interests cannot be easily supported by a country that has boycotted the Kyoto 
agreements and underestimated the environmental consequences of “Plan Colombia”.  
 
RESISTANCES 
 
The determination of the United States to impose strategic and political 
representations that rests on a weakened idea of law and sovereignty takes different forms and 
moves beyond the question of security. During the 35th OAS General Assembly in June 2005, 
the United States suggested, with no success, that a multinational forum be created to solve  
the Bolivian and Ecuadorian crises by adopting measures that implied an interruption of 
sovereignty. It suggested that a Special Committee of the OAS should monitor the evolution 
of democracy in the hemisphere through mechanisms that would allow civil organisations to 
inform the forum directly. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that democratic 
elections were not enough and that the OAS should supervise the activities of democratic 
governments. Even though this multinational project does not mention coercive measures, 
either sanctions or military actions, it does give the Special Committee and the General 
Secretary the authority to elaborate plans of action in order to solve the problems of Latin 
American democracies. It should be noted, however, that the Charter of the OAS establishes 
the non-intervention principle, that is, a state’s right to choose without external interference its 
political, economic and social systems and its position against war. The project has 
encountered resistance from Brazil, hesitation from Argentina and radical opposition from 
Venezuela, whose government thinks that the project has been promoted to allow US 
intervention in its country.70 Argentina acted as mediator between the US position and those 
of countries that considered the initiative to be interventionist.  
 
Venezuela and Brazil, which adhere to a “modern” definition of sovereignty and self-
government, believe that the sovereignty principle is essential if the different political systems 
are to avoid having to submit to a universal ‘empire’ that could be oppressive. Decision 
makers at strategic levels, restricted to a ‘modern’ order of interaction between sovereign 
states, according to the Westphalia System, have resisted the transformation of the 
sovereignty idea. These countries do not accept the concept of absence of effective 
sovereignty, nor of measurements that imply a tacit suspension of sovereignty. For these 
countries, state sovereignty cannot be relative.  
 
The economic and military integration agreements signed between Venezuela and 
Brazil in February 2005 were directly connected to the US policies for the region, even 
though the leadership projects of Brazil’s Lula and Venezuela’s Chavez and their national 
interests are very different. Brazil is seeking a regional leadership based on consensus, 
whereby it considers its neighbours’ national interests and the need to reach a consensus on an  
autonomous regional development project that is based on an equitable distribution of costs 
and benefits but without confrontation with the United States. Brazil has tried to maintain the 
role of mediator between the United States and Colombia on one side and Venezuela on the 
other.  
 
Brazil denies the idea of weak states and ungovernable zones and the absence of 
effective sovereignty over its territory. In 2006, at the Armies Conference at Montevideo, 
comments by the chief of the US Southern Command on the existence of “empty spaces” in 
the Amazonian region provoked the reaction of the Brazilian military delegation. (71) Brazil 
does not accept the idea of the Triple Frontera as a terrorist base, although it is constantly 
mentioned in US State Department documents on terrorism.  
 
The strategy of the United States not only affects a fundamental principle of Brazilian 
diplomacy (national sovereignty and non-intervention) but also a key question for Brazilian 
defence and national interest: Amazonia. During the Chancellors’ meeting of the Organization 
of the Treaty of Amazonian Cooperation in 2004, the question of sovereignty was related to 
the issue of natural resources. According to C. Amorin, Brazilian foreign affairs minister, 
Amazonian countries are the “sovereign guardians” of humanity’s natural resources and they 
have the right and the duty to promote sustainable development in the region. He emphasised 
that security is a fundamental issue for the region and referred to border protection and the 
trafficking of biological resources as permanent threats. The subsequent “Declaration of 
Manaus” assures the full exercise of sovereign rights on resources.  
 
In the 1990s, US policies caused the resurrection of archaic perceptions in Brazil. The 
Forward Operating Locations, the designation of Argentina as an extra-NATO ally of the 
United States and the military exercises that followed provoked a perception of geopolitical 
suffocation in Brazil. The policy of the United States in the subcontinent and the Argentinian 
position on that policy during the Menem Administration brought back old strategic 
representations that date from post-colonial times. According to this perception, Argentina has 
always tried to isolate Brazil by forming a Hispanic bloc under its own direction. The 
possibility of an anti-Brazilian alliance carried on by Argentina has always been present, from 
the Baron de Rio Branco to M. Travassos.72 Brazil and Argentina are medium powers and 
share the same area of influence, so establishing pre-eminence over one another  depends 
solely on their individual relationship with the United States. However, in post–Cold War, 
this situation has neither encouraged military and geopolitical confrontation nor strengthened 
the perception of threat linked to the “neighbourhood logic” that has characterised the region, 
in particular, during the second half of the twentieth century.  
 
 
CONCLUSION: IS LATIN AMERICA A STRATEGIC LABORATORY? 
 
Since post-colonial times, the Latin American perception of threats and its impact on 
defence policies have been associated with national border changes and the idea of conflict 
and power changes on the continent and in the rest of the world. In Latin America, the 
enhanced value of frontiers at the strategic level must be examined in relation to both the 
nature of the post–Cold War threat and US strategic representations.  
 
Numerous factors determine US geopolitical expansion in Latin America: access to 
foreign markets and natural resources, protection of US economic and financial interests, the 
pressure over the Latin American governments’ intended implementation of economic 
reforms aimed at opening their economies to foreign investment and trade, guarantees 
requested by the United States to counter these investments, the US relationship to extra-
regional powers and, finally, the obstruction of all autonomous political alternatives, some of 
which were important aspects of nineteenth-century foreign policy.  
 
Thus, it appears that the transnational dimension of the strategic representations 
promoted by the United States does not correspond to the traditional concept of national 
territory. This concept, which is the basis of the reshuffling of military architecture in Latin 
America after the Cold War, is rooted in a representation of the region that has been present 
since the 1940s but was systematised under the Democratic Clinton Administration in the 
1990s and further developed under the presidency of Republican George W. Bush in the early 
twenty-first century.  
 
Latin America illustrates that the US strategic model is shaped by norms and rules that 
tend to restrict national sovereignty through global decision-making bodies whose aim is to 
guarantee the security of the ways and means of the global economy. US strategic 
representations and practices, by unifying “internal” and “external” aspects of security, build 
on the transnational character of supply and demand for security. These representations, 
focused on transnational aspects, seek to deconstruct national sovereignties that constitute 
republican states. Although compatible with the development of cross-border projects, they do 
not necessarily coincide with the regional integration policies of Latin American states.  
 
The leadership of the United States promotes a double process: on the one hand, 
segregation within nation-states by means of political secession and, on the other, 
reunification by means of an economy of regional mega markets. The US macro-strategy 
presents two complementary dimensions: the weakening of national authorities and the 
rebuilding of a vaster unit on the basis of the market. This promotes a scale of balkanised 
organisation where political actors have little autonomy, while establishing macro-financial  
borders like the dollar area (the simplest form) or free-trade areas like the FTAA (a more 
elaborate form). (73)  
 
Since 1990, the US government has intensified its military deployments and reinforced 
military alliances in Latin America. Military deployment is an important piece of the neo-
Monroe Doctrine strategy. This strategy stresses the notion of both territory and physical 
presence in a way that contradicts the trust in technology that emerged from the first Gulf War 
and was demonstrated triumphantly in the “Revolution in Military Affairs”. The US strategy 
for Latin America is founded on an “archaic” (from its etymological sense of “beginning”) 
characteristic of domination: the territorial establishment.  
 
In Latin America, the United States has used drug trafficking, organised crime or 
terrorism as a reason to redefine regional security, starting from a transnational representation 
of conflicts and space that is closely related to the construction of a free-trade area. The 
United States has adopted a policy based on the preventive control of popular movements 
against liberal orthodoxy. However, if under the influence of the United States, the dynamics  
of security in the Southern Cone have become largely regionalised and new US 
representations have a role in the construction of strategic doctrines to occupy the vacuum left 
by the abandonment of the Doctrines of National Security, then we are still far from the 
consensus of the Cold War period and it is why there is diplomatic pressure to make local 
security agendas compatible with the US agenda. At the beginning of the twenty-first century,  
except for its relationship with Colombia, the United States is having difficulty establishing a 
system of alliances similar to the system it established with Brazil during the Cold War or 
with President Menem of Argentina immediately after the Cold War.  
 
According to US post–Cold War strategic thought, the previous status given to Latin 
America no longer coincides with its historically weak military position. In fact, the United 
States has tested a series of post–9/ 11 strategic concepts, used on a global level, in the region. 
Thus, Latin America is not only a region traditionally controlled by the United States but it is 
also a strategic “laboratory”, representing a complex area in which the United States has 
tested empirically its general global representations. During the 1990s, the Balkans served as 
a similar experimental zone.  
 
Latin America has had a role in the institutionalisation of an expeditionary practice 
founded on military action that, even though it was taking place locally, acquired a global 
significance upon which rests the post–Cold War hegemonic role of the United States. Some 
of the most evident elements of the strategic plan developed by the United States in the 
context of its “National Security Strategy” were already present in Latin America during the 
1990s: the territorial control through military bases, the use of non-governmental 
organisations for strategic purposes, the promotion of intervention through peace-keeping 
operations, military operations other than war, the transnational character of space, the private 
military operators and the diplomatic pressures to adjust local security agendas to US strategic 
interests. In addition, the concepts of “grey zones” and “failed states” and the transnational 
character of threats such as narco-terrorism, organised crime and the destruction of the 
ecosystem served as a justification for US interventionism, as well as for the redefinition of 
the functions of Latin American armies.  
 
The strategy used by the United States since the 1990s revealed the foreign policy that 
the US developed openly after 9/11. This policy implied increased US intervention in regions 
where its national interests were at risk (as in the Middle East) and the reinforcement of its 
military presence (as in Central and Pacific Asia). The US security strategy rests on the 
control of peripheral areas through stabilisation operations and implies a terrestrial presence 
by a redeployment of military forces. At the end of the twentieth century, the United States, 
modelling its Colombian policy, prepared its interventions in the world of the twenty-first 
century, later illustrated by its direct military actions in Liberia, Djibouti and the Philippines.  
 
However, the temporalities of Latin America and the rest of the periphery differ. The 
Latin American subcontinent has been the vanguard of neoliberal policies. Before this 
doctrine became a hegemonic ideology, it had been adopted in the subcontinent, especially in 
Chile and Argentina, in the 1970s. Early in the twenty-first century, the Middle East is slowly 
starting the process of liberalisation and integration into the global world, a process that is 
further accelerated by the war against terrorism.  
 
Any post–Cold War strategic analysis must take into account the importance  
of neo-liberal policy. Ironically, the US strategic representations do not consider the impact of 
neo-liberal policies on the weakening of the state. The new threats – criminal organisations, 
from guerrillas to terrorist groups – take advantage of the global system, that is, the global 
world and the regional economies that have resulted from the liberalisation process promoted 
by the United States.  
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